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ABSTRACT 
Only listed companies operate legally can the capital market keep healthily 
operation. However, over the past years, unceasing irregularities of listed companies 
has not only undermined confidence of investors and brought huge loss to them, but 
also disrupted the order of capital market. Listed companies work as the shield and 
tool of insiders when they misappropriate of interests from investor. As a result, it is 
significant to specify and constrain the operation of listed companies. Agent problems 
are prominent in modern corporate. Relation to the first agent problems, how does the 
top managerial power influence irregularities of listed companies? How about the 
related party transactions, which is seen as a mean of tunnel of shareholder and relates 
to the second agent problems? Is it necessary to limit effectively and concern of these 
two factors? This paper attempts to prove those questions thought empirical research 
and hopes to provide a reference to regulators on supervision of listed companies 
effectively. 
This paper takes the listed companies in A-share market from 2005 to 2014 as 
the research object, and defines the company that has irregularities over the past ten 
years as Violation Company. This paper first studies the effects of related party 
transaction levels and the top managerial power on listed companies’ irregularities, 
and finds out that related party transaction levels and the top managerial power 
significantly enhanced the irregularities of listed companies. Then, this paper 
discusses the effects of cross multiply items of related party transaction levels and the 
top managerial power on the irregularities of listed companies, and finds out that the 
greater managerial power is, the more violations of listed companies related party 
transactions may lead to. That is, management may achieve opportunism behavior 
thought related party transactions. Finally, this paper examines the effect of 
ownership concentration and external audit on irregularities of listed companies, and 
finds out that shareholder may conspire with managers to misappropriate of interests 
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lessen irregularities according to related party transactions of listed companies. 
Related party transaction of listed companies is indeed a tool for insiders to 
achieve their opportunism behavior. But without effective supervision, self-interested 
behavior of managers may damage the interests of others. Therefore, regulators 
should pay close attention to the company with high level of related-party transactions, 
large managerial power and highly concentrated ownership. Meanwhile, in order to 
prevent damage to the interests of companies, shareholders should also limit the 
self-interested behavior of managers. 
Key words:  Corporate Irregularities; Related Party Transactions; Managerial 
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第 1 章   引言  
1.1 研究背景  
我国资本市场历经二十余载发展，经过不断完善已经颇具规模。截止 2015












公司外部人而言较为复杂且信息不对称程度较高（Hwang et al., 2013），且关联交
易定价也未必符合公平市场竞争原则，这些都给上市公司内部人的机会主义行为
提供了温床与便利。对比我国关联交易勇攀新高的规模（如图 2），2014 年关联









































































































































1.4 研究思路与框架  
本文的研究框架如图 3 所示。  
































图 3：研究框架图  
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第 2 章   文献回顾  
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